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ABSTRACT: The pragmatist account of action in Brandom’s 
Making it Explicit offers a compelling defense of social 
embeddedness of acting. Its virtue consists of redefining 
the agent’s reasons for action in terms of her public 
commitments and entitlements. However, this account 
remains too intellectualist insofar as it neglects the em-
bodied sense allowing the agent to respond to various 
situational demands and social constraints. In my article, 
I provide a less disembodied account of action that 
draws on Dreyfus’s emphasis on bodily skills as constitu-
tive aspects of intentional acting. Dreyfus’ notion of 
absorbed coping certainly highlights the role of body and 
affectivity in guiding the performance of action, but it 
ends up in underestimating the role of discursive and 
conceptual capacities in human agency. Against Dreyfus, 
I will demonstrate that involved and embodied coping 
not only answers to the demands of a given situation, 
but also involves responsiveness to reasons. My ambi-
tion is to defend a continuity between practical reason-
ing, i.e. our capacity to justify our performances through 
reasons, and our embodied coping skills, a continuity 
that has been overlooked by Brandom’s intellectualist 
and denied by Dreyfus’ anti-rationalist accounts. 
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Against all conventional attempts to explain action by 
agent’s individual beliefs and desires, Brandom reveals 
and emphasizes the social dimension of acting. His 
normative pragmatism explains that the sociality of 
action is grounded in our capacity to justify our various 
performances in the game of giving and asking for rea-
sons, where our intentions become public commitments 
to be acknowledged by our peers as entitlements for 
our acting. In the first part, I will lay out the merits of 
Brandom’s account that consist in making explicit the 
social and rational underpinnings of action. Instead of 
being identified with private mental states, reasons to 
act should be viewed as social commitments that we 
publicly endorse. Since the content of intention is de-
termined by its articulation within the game of reason-
giving, all intentional acting presupposes discursive and 
therefore social practices as the background of their 
intelligibility. Responsiveness to reasons and sensitivity 
to shared rules are thus revealed as essential to our 
intentional agency. However, Brandom owes his readers 
an explanation about the way in which the sensitivity to 
rules intervenes not only in our endorsing practical 
commitments to act, but constitutes also part and par-
cel of performing the action. In Brandom, the agent first 
adopts a practical attitude, which then brings about her 
action causally. On this account, only the first stage of 
deliberation and endorsing practical commitments 
involves sensitivity to norms and rules, while the bodily 
execution of action does not. It merely follows from the 
antecedent endorsement of practical commitments. His 
conception of action thus remains only contingently 
embodied since it reduces the body to a mere instru-
ment of realizing the practical attitude adopted on a 
discursively articulated level. 
The second half of my paper seeks to redefine our 
sensitivity to norms and rules in a less intellectualist 
fashion. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus’ analysis 
of motor intentionality, I strive to expose the role of the 
body in rule-following. More precisely, I claim that our 
embodied coping skills and habits allow us to be sensi-
tive to norms without a need for representation. My aim 
is to delineate our bodily responsiveness to the norma-
tive significance of the situation in which we are actively 
engaged. The embodied sensitivity to rules entails that 
one’s own body is responsive to the affordances as well 
as to the social constraints and situational demands. 
Thanks to our habits, we implicitly and spontaneously 
understand what is proper and improper in a given social 
milieu. In other words, our acting is constantly backed by 
our embodied sense of correctness and incorrectness, 
which is engrained in our acquired yet flexible habits and 
skills. However, while Dreyfus considers absorbed bodily 
coping as non-rational and non-conceptual, I argue on 
the contrary that our action remains responsive to rea-
sons even when we do not articulate them (not even for 
ourselves). Such thing is possible because, first, we count 
on reasons that are deposited or sedimented in com-
monly shared bodily habits, and secondly, we rely upon 
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our coupling with the norm-governed and familiar social 
environment to which we constantly adjust our conduct. 
Then, my final aim is to defend a continuity between 
practical reasoning (i.e. the capacity to justify our per-
formances through reasons) and our embodied coping 
skills, which is overlooked in Brandom’s intellectualist 
approach and explicitly denied by Dreyfus’ anti-rational-
ist polemics. While both authors fail to notice the recip-
rocal ties between our embodied coping skills and 
discursive capacities, I will demonstrate that our involved 
and embodied coping with the demands of a given situa-
tion necessarily entails responsiveness to reasons and, 
conversely, that our linguistic performances presuppose 
our bodily responsiveness to solicitations.  
 
The social dimension of action in Brandom’s pragma-
tism 
 
Brandom’s pragmatic and inferential account of action 
received relatively little attention in the otherwise large 
corpus of literature inspired by his normative pragma-
tism.1 Such neglect is not only surprising, but also regret-
ful, since Brandom’s redefinition of intentions in terms of 
acknowledged commitments opens up new ways to 
understand human agency and its dependency upon the 
shared space of reasons. According to the traditional 
view, action differs from mere behavior to the extent in 
which they are brought for and guided by agent’s inten-
tions, resulting from her individual beliefs and desires. 
Against such an individualistic or monological account of 
action, Brandom objects that we cannot start with “in-
trinsically motivating preferences or desires” that would 
ground the authority of “norms governing practical 
reasoning and defining rational action” (Brandom 2000, 
31). Such a conception would amount to the impossible 
task to derive norms from merely first-person attitudes 
of members of the community, criticized as psycholo-
gism since Frege’s times. In the special case of action, 
such criticism resists any derivation of what is valid (gen-
1 The two notable and insightful exceptions are R. Stout (2010) 
and S. Levine (2012).  
eral norms) from what individual members of the com-
munity actually take to be valid (because something 
occurs within their minds). Brandom’s proposal consists 
of considering things the other way around: it is only 
because we are able to endorse normative commitments 
and to attribute to each other normative entitlements to 
act that we can be said to hold particular intentions, 
beliefs, desires, preferences and other practical atti-
tudes. In other words, only because we rationally assess 
each other’s intentions in the game of giving and asking 
for reasons, that each one of us can be sure of having 
identifiable intentions. It is precisely this discursive artic-
ulation of our reasons that allows us to be acknowledged 
as actors with intentions amendable to critical assess-
ment, which includes assessment about what should we 
do to make these intentions true.  
Furthermore, the very content of the agent’s inten-
tion is beholden to her capacity to articulate and defend 
its rationale in the social practice consisting of exposing 
the premises behind such intention and defending the 
acceptability of its consequences. It follows that an agent 
would be unable to identify her own intentions (and 
therefore unable to act in the light of reasons and 
norms) if she were not able to articulate their content in 
the social game of reason-giving. Thus, each of us, in 
order to properly assess the meaning of what we intend 
to do, is answerable to social norms, according to which 
all such inferential relations between intentions and 
reasons for action are assessed in discursive practices. In 
other words, it is only within a larger sphere of public 
discussion that we might ascertain whether our inten-
tions – in their inferential connections with other practi-
cal attitudes – provide a sufficient set of reasons to 
justify one’s action.2  
How does a discursive articulation of practical rea-
sons in the reasons-giving game come about? We expose 
our own intention into the public space of reasons and 
2 For an instructive overview of Brandom’s account of the social 
dimension of reasoning and the inferential articulation of the 
o-
duction: Inferentialism’s Years of Travel and Its Logico-Philoso-
 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vol .  10 ,  Issue 1 ,  2019  
SI T U A T E D  A C T I N G  A N D  E M B O D I E D  C O P I N G 
O ndr e j  S v e c  
 
25
thus we make our action intelligible and treat it as a 
candidate for a rational assessment. Insofar as these 
reasons are acknowledged, they become commitments 
for which we are accountable in front of others. On this 
account, when the agent declares what she intends to 
do, she endorses a commitment rather than describing 
her inner state of mind. Think about Luther’s famous 
words “Here I stand, I can do no other” when he was 
summoned to the Diet of Worms in 1521. Rather than 
factual assertion resulting from his self-knowledge, such 
an attestation is better understood as an illocutionary 
act through which he gave a public account of the link 
between his convictions and the way in which he intend-
ed to conduct himself in his further confrontation with 
opponents. 
Endorsing a commitment entails that we let ourselves 
being judged by our capacity to act and live up to them. In 
this way, what we intend is also accountable to what we 
really do. No matter how much I cherish the idea of be-
coming a guitar-player, if I never start practicing guitar 
and dedicate all my leisure time to sports or family, I 
should doubt about the reality of any such intention (and 
I might be challenged by others to question the authentic-
ity of my intention). I can thus be sure to have distinct 
intentions to the extent that I am able to act accordingly 
to them. The crucial point of Brandom’s inferential prag-
matics lies in the further development of this idea: what it 
means to act accordingly to such and such intention 
cannot be decided unilaterally by me, since it is a matter 
of public articulation of stakes involved. Even in the case 
of a supposedly lonely guitar-player, the fulfilling of her 
intention to become one is answerable to the recognition 
by others that she holds in esteem as successful players 
or at least as persons able to judge her performances. In 
the absence of reciprocal attribution of commitments, 
each agent would be accountable only to herself, i.e. 
would be committed to whatever seems right to herself. 
But if there is no way to establish that one is wrong about 
one’s commitment, there is no commitment at all. Herein 
lies the social dimension of acting for reasons: whether 
the agent is committed to act in a certain way depends 
upon what she is able to articulate in the norm-laden and 
social discursive practices, not upon something that only 
she can access through introspection. In other words, if 
knowing one’s intentions implies knowing what must hold 
true for accomplishing them successfully, then our per-
sonal practical commitments are intelligible only within 
open-ended and inferentially articulated practices. 
Then, not only is the content of agent’s intention, 
but also the meaning of her action based on such inten-
tion determined by larger inferential significance of her 
avowed attitudes. In order to make sense of our action, 
our co-actors and interlocutors strive to infer collateral 
commitments that serve as both premises and conse-
quences of our practical stances. Furthermore, one’s 
commitment to some intentions and performances 
might remove her entitlement to other performances. 
Thus, in one of previous Czech governments, a Social 
Democrat Minister for Education put her child to a pri-
vate and high-priced lycée and then acted surprised 
when criticized for her (supposedly private) act. ‘Does 
not anybody strive to get the best available education for 
her children?’, she claimed. Yet, public opinion and press 
did not dispute at all the intention to see her child placed 
in the best school possible, but rather her intention to 
act politically as a Social Democrat Minister for Educa-
tion. This intention, no matter how sincerely held by the 
Minister herself, was indeed identified in the public 
debate with a commitment to making the best available 
education in public, rather than private schools. What 
can we learn from this actual case is that we are often 
held responsible for the implications of our commit-
ments beyond what we are able to grasp reflectively. 
Admittedly, such explicit commitment appears most 
visibly within the field of political action, where one is 
repeatedly and most severely questioned not only about 
her intentions, but also about their inferential implica-
tions. Nevertheless, we are required to undertake similar 
responsibilities even in our daily lives, whenever we are 
solicited to provide reasons for our acting by others or 
whenever we invite them to support our initiatives, in 
the hope of enhancing our own capacity to act.  
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Brandom’s merits and shortcomings 
 
The principal merit of Brandom’s account of action 
consists in emphasizing the social dimension of action 
that disqualifies any individualistic or monological view 
of acting. Brandom invites us to consider action as so-
cially embedded not only in its overt performance, but 
also in its very intentional structure, insofar as he sug-
gests to treat intentions as publicly endorsed commit-
ments, rather than private mental states. The social 
dimension of acting is further developed in his claim 
that any reasons to act worthy of its name should be – 
at least in principle – linguistically articulated. Finally, 
Brandom is able to account for the difference between 
human agency and responsiveness to rules, on the one 
hand, and inanimate objects’ subjection to laws of na-
ture, on the other. Such difference is most often ex-
plained in a Kantian fashion: while objects obey to laws 
blindly, rational agents act according to the idea of 
principles that guide their action. In order to avoid 
representationalist connotation of Kant’s “Vorstellung 
von Regeln zu bestimmen” (1968, 32), Brandom (1994, 
31) prefers to insist on agent’s ability to adopt an “atti-
tude towards the law” to be followed.3 Between the 
rule and its instantiation in action, agent’s attitude 
towards the law would amount to introducing a third 
term allowing for a freedom within constraints of the 
rule-governed space of reasons. In other words, agent’s 
capacity to endorse practical commitments in the light 
of the rule(s) to be followed would account for a differ-
ence between acting for reasons and obeying to natural 
necessities. While rational agents are sensitive and 
responsive to the rules, inanimate things in nature are 
merely subject to natural laws. At the same time, Bran-
dom would still be able to bypass the Kantian reliance 
on the mental representation of law as the distinctive 
feature of human responsiveness to rules and norms. 
3 Stout (2010) provides a detailed and enlightening analysis 
about Kantian heritage in Brandom’s differentiating between 
the ways rational agents and inanimate objects are subject to 
rules. 
That is why he insists, that our attitudes towards the 
rules, according to which we guide our conduct, are of 
social, public and linguistic nature (Brandom 1994, 31ff).  
His anti-representationalist stance notwithstanding, 
Brandom’s picture is beholden to a mediational episte-
mological picture to the extent in which it separates our 
perception from our acting and inserts our discursive 
capacities as an intermediary between perceptual “en-
tries” and practical “exits”, to use Sellarsian terminology 
embraced by Brandom (1994, 235). On this view, the 
agent, informed by his perceptual and discursively articu-
lated acquaintance with the standing situation, first 
adopts a practical attitude according to his self-posi-
tioning in the space of reasons, which then brings about 
her action causally: 
What in action causally elicits the production of 
performable states of affairs (by the exercise of 
reliable differential responsive dispositions) is in 
the first instance deontic attitudes rather than 
statuses: acknowledgments of practical commit-
ments (Brandom 1994, 261). 
 
Brandom not only owes his readers a better explanation of 
what these “differential responsive dispositions” might be, 
but most of all, his account introduces a major gap be-
tween our perceptual capacities and the guidance of our 
active performance, since our acting upon the world de-
cides how the world appears to us, what phenomena will 
become relevant in the situation in which we actively 
partake. Insofar as it fails to recognize this essential entan-
glement between acting and perceiving, Brandom’s ac-
count reminds the classical picture according to which 
perception provides the input to be grasped by our cogni-
tive and conceptual capacities in order to provide, as a 
final step, a determinate reply to the same external envi-
ronment. To be sure, Brandom’s rejection of the “myth of 
the given” is a clear sign of his distance towards this em-
piricist affiliation, the fact remains that he re-introduces an 
illegitimate separation between perception and action, 
with a space of reasons standing between perceptual 
entry transitions and behavioral exits.  
Furthermore, one might raise objections against 
Brandom’s decision to separate the realization of our 
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practical commitments into two stages. In the first stage, 
we endorse a practical attitude through our partaking in 
the reason-giving game. In the second one, we are caus-
ally induced to act according to our acknowledgment of 
such commitment: “In action, alterations of deontic 
attitude, specifically acknowledgements of practical 
commitments, serve as stimuli eliciting nonlinguistic 
performances.” (Brandom 1994, 235). Rowland Stout has 
already identified an important negative side-effect of 
Brandom’s “two-ply theory of action” that limits our 
responsiveness to rules only to the first step consisting of 
production of attitudes: 
The second stage involves things actually being 
made to happen but involves no sensitivity to 
rules (or reasons). This fails to take seriously the 
idea of action as a process of rationally trans-
forming the world— i.e., a process in which the 
changes characteristic of the action involve the 
rationality characteristic of agency. Instead the 
rationality characteristic of agency is manifested 
in the production of attitudes (Stout 2010, 148). 
 
If the second stage is identified as a causal response 
elicited by our acknowledgement of commitment, then 
our performance of the attitude cannot be guided by our 
responsiveness to rules. I subscribe to Stout’s criticism 
and intend to develop it further into two interrelated 
arguments that will prove crucial to my own position. To 
my understanding, what is omitted in Brandom’s account 
is precisely our embodied sensitivity to the specific de-
mands of a given situation and, consequently, the em-
beddedness of our temporally unfolding acting to the 
ever-changing and open-ended situation. 
First, the practical skills involved in our competent 
performance of action are open to normative correction 
to the extent they are publicly expressed. If the only 
thing involved in bringing about the action were the 
causal functioning of our objective body and its physio-
logical mechanisms, there would be no possibility to 
assess its functioning as competent or incompetent, 
appropriate or inappropriate. However, it is a matter of 
fact that skills involved in our performances are deemed 
corrigible and hence accountable to our shared norms of 
conduct. Concerning the open-ended character of situa-
tion in which we have to act, Brandom completely omits 
to account for our embodied capacity to track subtle or 
profound modifications of the game that unfolds while 
we are acting, because of our own initiative and other 
agents’ responses to it. Our acting has to remain flexible 
insofar as the agent must repeatedly provide refined 
replies to a fluctuating pull of new solicitations and af-
fordances that has not been present to her at the mo-
ment of her initial acknowledging of commitment.  
 
Dreyfus on embodied coping and sensitivity to solicita-
tions 
 
In order to see how the two above-mentioned require-
ments for situated acting are met by our bodily involve-
ment in a situation, let us first turn to Hubert Dreyfus’ 
account of absorbed coping. According to Dreyfus, most of 
our actions consist of perceiving what to do and respond-
ing to it without thinking. We do not even need to formu-
late any intention in order to guide our action, we rather 
perceive a possibility to act and we let ourselves to be 
drawn by such perceived affordances and solicitations. 
Dreyfus (2013: 37n12) helpfully introduces a conceptual 
distinction between “affordances” and “solicitations”. On 
Gibson’s account (1986: 127–43), affordances correspond 
to all perceivable possibilities offered by an environment 
to a certain kind of creature and they are real features of 
the world. Solicitations, for Dreyfus, are those affordances 
that are salient from the perspective of our long or short-
term projects and that are able to draw us to act precisely 
because of their relevance. Seeing a stick as an affordance 
to swing it like a weapon is only possible for an organism 
equipped with longer hands, but it is perceived as a solici-
tation to act only for an agent ready to engage in fighting 
(be it real or playful).4  
Dreyfus’ emphasis on our practical openness to af-
fordances and our sensitivity to solicitations provides a 
welcome antidote to Brandom’s account of agency that 
4 However, whether an affordance will appear as a solicitation 
to an agent depends not only to organism’s needs and desires, 
as Dreyfus would have it, but also to her acknowledged, i.e. 
“Brandomian” commitments. 
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omits to take into consideration the embodied skills 
allowing us to cope with the difficulties and requirements 
of any interpersonal transaction. These skills include our 
affective attunement to various demands that the situa-
tion imposes on us. More than often, we feel that the 
situation calls for an intervention of our part. For exam-
ple, I feel drawn to reply in an angrily way to a demeaning 
offense. At the same time, I remain affectively attuned to 
norms of conduct and various hierarchical positions of 
other agents and the right ways to address them. Certain 
possibilities to redeem the situation just feel right, while 
others are simply out of question as inappropriate, with-
out any need to think about them. These considerations 
aim to enlarge Brandom’s overly intellectualist account of 
sensitivity to norms, that focuses unilaterally on our 
rational and intralinguistic assessments. We can see that 
the normative dimension of our conduct entails more 
than responsiveness to reasons and includes all kinds of 
“felt pulls” and embodied responsiveness to various 
degrees of salience in perceived opportunities for action.  
Furthermore, our affective sensitivity serves to guide 
our acting in providing a constant feedback about how 
we fare in respect with tasks to be performed. Not only 
is our body sensitive to the demands of a given situation, 
but it is also sensitively monitoring if its conduct meets 
or not such demands. Such a tracking includes affective 
responsiveness to our ongoing and partial successes and 
failures in all such endeavors. Each agent unreflectively, 
but continuously assesses if she is doing well at the given 
moment precisely because she senses a tension when 
loosing or deviating from an optimal grip on things (Drey-
fus 2014, 246). Such a feedback provides us both with a 
sense of situation and with felt hints or indicators telling 
us whether our acting is making the situation better or 
worse. For all these various reasons, our acting upon the 
world might be purposive without the need of conscious 
representations of a goal to be achieved and without 
endorsing a discursively articulate commitment.  
How do these descriptions of absorbed coping relate 
to Brandom’s account of action? How does Dreyfus’ 
phenomenological analysis of embodied responsiveness 
to solicitations modify or supplement Brandom’s under-
standing of action’s responsiveness to reasons? In my 
view, one promising way to remedy the insufficiencies of 
Brandom’s and other intellectualist accounts of acting 
would be to recognize the specificity of the space of 
motivations as the primary ground allowing to make 
sense of human action, and then, to consider how to 
move from there to the realm of reasons.  
 
The space of motivations 
 
For Dreyfus (2005, 56), we primarily move and orient 
ourselves within the space of motivations, where we rely 
on our situation-specific responsiveness to the most 
salient affordances. Emphasizing the space of motiva-
tions as the primary background of our being-in-the-
world opens a promising path for understanding how we 
are moved by the world neither in a mechanistic nor in 
an idealistic sense: we are moved neither by mental 
representations of things, nor by their physical and caus-
al impingements on us, but first and foremost by their 
perceived solicitations in relation to our bodily capaci-
ties. My proposal aims to apply Dreyfus’ as well as Mer-
leau-Ponty’s account of motivation in order to empha-
size the role of the lived and living body in the genesis of 
affective monitoring that guides our action. In particular, 
the methodological choice of starting with the space of 
motivations – rather than with causal interactions or 
cognitive judgments – allows us to appreciate the contri-
bution of kinesthetic experiences to the monitoring of 
how one’s body is positioned with regards to the re-
quirements of its project and to the normatively struc-
tured environment. These two kinds of demands are not 
to be thought separately, but rather as merging togeth-
er, to the extent that the situation in which I am involved 
is articulated primarily according to “I can” or “I can’t”, 
rather than “I think”. The first thing to observe is that our 
performances within a perceptual field are closely tied to 
felt variations of our capacity to meet the requirements, 
novelties and disturbances of our environment. I am 
affectively responsive to all kinds of tugs and pulls of the 
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world according to what I am able or unable to do about 
them. I am affectively sensible to certain matters as 
threatening when I tacitly see my bodily capacities re-
stricted (typically in dark places or in other cases of 
momentary sensory impairment), as frustrating when I 
perceive others as obstacles on my path, and as exciting 
when I hope with uncertainty to be capable of living up 
to some rare occasion. As an integral part of this syn-
chronization or “living communication with the world” 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 53), kinesthetic experiences and 
other “gut feelings” tacitly shape and articulate worldly 
matters into relevant, recalcitrant, attracting and other-
wise existentially significant objects or situations. Bodily 
immersed in the space of motivations, we are constantly 
seeking to ascertain our grip on things.  
This practical and non-conceptual orientation is 
something that Brandom himself acknowledges as an 
essential part of intentionality. Furthermore, intentional-
ity itself is not so much the mark of mental, as it was for 
Brentano and his followers, but rather the general capac-
ity proper to sentient beings allowing them to comport 
themselves towards the world. „[The] founding idea of 
pragmatism is that the most fundamental kind of inten-
tionality (in the sense of directedness towards objects) is 
the practical involvement with objects exhibited by a 
sentient creature dealing skillfully with its world” (Bran-
dom 2008, 178). Despite his acknowledgment of practi-
cal and infra-rational know-how as a basic kind of our 
relating to the world, Brandom does not recognize the 
space of motivations as the third term that can be nei-
ther reduced to “space of causes” (laws of nature), nor 
to “space of reasons” (rational assessments). As we have 
seen, in his “two-ply” account of human agency, he 
decomposes our capacity to act into two aspects and 
situates each of them into one of the two distinct 
spheres: “an element of conceptually articulated en-
dorsement, and a reliable differential responsive disposi-
tion” (Brandom 2010: 328). In its first stage, endorsing a 
practical commitment is entirely situated within a space 
of reasons; in its output, the final stage, the very perfor-
mance of an action is reduced to a causal interaction 
with the objective world (including our body seen as 
object).  
For Brandom, our action is intelligible only insofar we 
are able to account for it in the game of giving and asking 
for reasons. He thus omits the possibility of making 
sense of one’s own or others’ acting in terms of “being 
motivated” by the situation and its most salient af-
fordances to which we are immediately responsive. As I 
have argued above, in order to remain the optimal way 
of replying to unfolding demands of one’s environment, 
the performance of an action cannot amount to nothing 
more but an exit transition from the space of reasons as 
if this final output were already determined by an earlier 
commitment endorsed by the agent. The space of moti-
vations is not without a logic of its own: it is the logic of 
motor cues, vector forces of attraction and repulsion, 
salient perceptual affordances and gradually relevant 
aspects to be dealt with. Action is thus intelligible on a 
more basic level, when we recognize our activity to be 
motivated by the affordances of the given situation to 
which we are unreflectively responsive. Because of the 
binary separation of reasons and causes as the only two 
candidates allowing to make sense of action, Brandom’s 
account does not have means to explain action out of 
emotion and other pre-conceptual, affective attune-
ments to motivationally salient aspects of the situation. 
In Dreyfus’ account of action, to be motivated to act 
in a certain way should not be equated with acting for 
reasons. First of all, felt tensions, gut feelings or immedi-
ate perceptual assessment of salient affordances moti-
vate the agent to act in a certain way or to take a certain 
course of action, but they do not necessarily determinate 
the goals of the action itself, as reasons for acting do. 
While discursive articulation of reasons is supposed to 
identify what should be done, perceiving a salient af-
fordance indicates a way to be followed and possible 
scenarios one might expect when following the indicated 
path. Secondly, while reasons to act might be shared and 
acknowledged as valid from a detached perspective, 
motivations to act are often far too much situation-
specific to count as reasons (Dreyfus 2007b, 107). Moti-
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vations are simply part of agent’s subjective engagement 
with the ongoing and ambivalent situation, while the 
space of reasons requires to appeal, in Dreyfus’ picture, 
to universal claims about what counts as reason for 
what. The third difference is connected with the previ-
ous one. When we translate the flow of motivations in 
terms of reasons, i.e. when we strive to grasp the logical 
structure behind our pre-reflective tendencies to act, we 
inevitably reduce the highly complex and miscellaneous 
mesh of motivating features into an abstract scheme of 
our acting. The ambivalence of our vital communication 
with the world is simplified, when I stand back from it in 
order to translate my being-moved into a set of beliefs, 
desires and explicit reasons. When I do this, “when I 
want to express myself, I crystallize a collection of indef-
inite motives in an act of consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty 
2012, 309). To grasp one’s implicit motivations con-
sciously, i.e. to translate non-thetic solicitations to move 
one’s body into an explicit reason to act, has a price to 
be paid. In Mark Wrathall’s (2005, 119) words, any at-
tempt to reformulate one’s motivated experiences into 
reasons “ends up focusing on some narrow subset of a 
rich and complex set of motives”. For all these various 
points, motives are not entirely reducible to reasons.  
So far, I have reappropriated for the purposes of my 
account of action the basic tenets of Dreyfus’s original 
insights concerning embodied coping skills and their 
importance for guiding our various everyday perfor-
mances. Now, it is time to critically assess the relevance 
of Dreyfus analysis for a more general and pragmatically 
oriented theory of human action. First, one might object 
from a Brandomian perspective that emphasizing sub-
ject-related motivations amount to discard the social 
dimension of acting that is crucial for its proper under-
standing. Second, one might wonder if Dreyfus’ presen-
tation of “absorbed coping” and “acting-in-the flow” as 
paradigmatic cases of action does not result in a flat-
tened picture of human agency insofar as it appeals to 
cases of mere behavior. Finally, there is a suspicion that 
even our most basic bodily coping does not answer only 
to the demands of a given situation, but also involves 
responsiveness to reasons, against Dreyfus’s repeated 
claim.  
The first worry concerns the way of making action in-
telligible while appealing to someone’s personal and 
context-specific motivations. Since both perception of 
affordances and responsiveness to solicitations is sub-
ject-related, have we not lost the social dimension of 
acting emphasized by Brandom? One could rephrase 
Brandom’s objection against monological accounts of 
action in the way that rejects the possibility of making 
sense of action within the space of motivations: privately 
felt motivations (analogically to privately held intentions) 
commit us neither to act nor to be accountable for our 
action, hence, they are not essential in bringing about 
the action, nor to make such action intelligible. In order 
to reply to this objection, we have to say more about the 
relation between bodily coping skills and habits.  
In my view, the ability to experience salient aspects 
of a given situation is made possible by habits that we 
acquire mostly by repeated participating in structured 
practices, understood as patterns of appropriate action. 
Since our practical know-how about what to do and how 
to proceed is carried in and encoded in these practices, 
we can become sensitive to the rules of a game simply 
by taking part in it and learning from our co-actors’ 
replies to our performances. Once we have incorporated 
the logic of a certain practice into our skills, we are able 
to reply smoothly to the situational demands without 
having to worry about these rules, at least most of the 
time. The primary locus of an agent’s understanding thus 
lies not in her own representations, but in shared prac-
tices that form the background for her orientation and 
skillful coping within a variety of situations. Therefore, 
even though the agent’s responsiveness to salient af-
fordances stems from her own felt motivations, the 
sociality of her involved coping with the situation is 
guaranteed by her enculturated bodily habits and skills.  
The sociality of our embodied coping is thus guaran-
teed by the way in which we acquire our skills and hab-
its. Sometimes, “one learns the game by watching how 
others play it” (Wittgenstein 1953: 27). Such imitation of 
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exemplary conducts is never mechanical, but socially 
articulated: even when we learn our skills by merely 
imitating others, there is an element of social recognition 
involved in such a learning. Children spontaneously 
imitate their parents, university students unreflectively 
follow their professors’ styles of reasoning and speaking, 
beginner dancers shape their skills through synchronizing 
their bodily movements, steps and posture with those of 
their more experienced partners and so on. Two remarks 
pointing beyond Wittgenstein are in order: while he 
acknowledges the plurality of possible introductions to 
the game, he emphasizes that mere watching might be 
enough. I would rather rephrase this point by saying that 
participation might be enough, insofar as physically 
putting oneself in different situations of the game allows 
the agent (unlike the mere spectator) to be guided by 
others via their bodily negative and positive feedback. 
Secondly, such an unreflective imitation is more than 
often accompanied by reflective critical assessment, 
where the social recognition plays an explicit role in 
enforcing the validity of the rules to be “blindly” fol-
lowed. Only those who the novice recognizes as compe-
tent social actors are those whose consent matters to 
her when she strives to see herself acknowledged as 
acting correctly, that is, to be assessed her performance 
as fulfilling the norms of a given practice. When writing 
her first papers in philosophy, the novice practitioner 
searches to comply with demands of her peers, profes-
sors and not of her parents (unless they are themselves 
acknowledged experts in the field of humanities). Does 
she or her peers or professors evaluate the norms in 
terms of which she or them understand the required 
norms and skills? Only to a certain level and probably 
never in their entirety. One can always explicitly criticize 
any particular norm guiding one’s conduct or any limited 
set of such interconnected norms, but one can never 
question all of them at once. Considering that there are 
potentially infinite manners in which philosophical ideas 
might be expressed (think about Socrates’ provocations 
of his fellow citizen, Enlightenment pamphlets or Nie-
tzsche’s puns and aphorisms), there is probably some 
blindness in almost everybody within academia following 
the prevailing style, rhetoric and structure of philosophi-
cal arguments to which one was raised.5 The point of this 
observation is not to criticize, as so many have already 
done, the evils of conformism, but an almost contrary 
claim: our tendency to conform our speech, thinking and 
behavior to shared practices is to be considered as the 
background condition of our capacity to think and act 
with others. Our explicit acknowledgement of rules is not 
necessary, quite the contrary: our unreflective conformi-
ty to rules is a necessary pre-condition of our conceptual 
skills. When interacting with others within an already 
rule-governed practice or game, we develop a non-
conceptual feel about how to behave correctly and some 
fine-tuned understanding about the right adjustments to 
be made towards other participants moves. To be sure, 
merely imitating exemplary models does rarely trans-
form the follower into an expert of her own, but it is an 
essential part for becoming a competent agent able to 
act in accordance with the requirements of the rule-
governed social environment. The pragmatic lesson to be 
learned from these observations is that individual action 
depends on socially acquired habits and not the other 
way round, as if individual and single actions were the 
basis of all intelligibility, while habits would be relegated 
to mindless repetition of the same.6 
The relation between habitual conduct, instantiated 
in absorbed coping, and intentional action is closely 
linked to the second concern to be raised about Dreyfus’ 
analysis of coping insofar as it presents itself as an alter-
native theory of action tout court. An objection to such 
ambition might be formulated in terms of a traditional 
question concerning the difference between action 
5 “Blindly” obeying the rules of the game thus amounts on my 
interpretation to knowing how to act correctly (and being in 
possession of respective embodied skill for telling the correct 
from the incorrect), even when one is not able to evaluate the 
validity, the explicit content and the reach of the norms to 
which one replies while partaking in a particular practice. This 
partial interpretation does not aim to give an exhaustive ac-
count of the rule-following problem in Wittgenstein, nor to 
engage with the massive amount of its extant readings.  
6 For further development of the pragmatist Copernican revolu-
tion consisting of placing habits as grounds for all individual and 
intentional action, see Kilpinen (2009).  
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properly said and mere behavior. Does Dreyfus’ account 
of what he calls “skilled action” deal with actions at all, 
or does it rather provide a phenomenological description 
of mere conducts? Most of the time, Dreyfus (2005, 
2007, 2013) takes cases of driving around, acting-in-the-
flow, exiting doors or keeping an appropriate distance in 
elevators to be paradigmatic cases of human agency. 
However, these and similar cases seem hardly suitable to 
illustrate the peculiar nature of human action, since they 
are mostly instances of everyday behavior. Dreyfus might 
answer that even when my actions are simply drawn and 
guided by perceived solicitations and inculcated re-
quirements and constraints, they are still purposive and 
answerable to norms of appropriateness (as we have 
seen above). This should lead to the acknowledgment 
that intentional and deliberate actions are just a subset 
of larger family of purposive and normatively controlled 
action. Furthermore, Dreyfus (1991: 72) provides an 
explanation about the emergence of deliberate and 
intentional action from the background of our unreflec-
tive coping based on bodily skills and habits: when things 
go wrong and our fluid coping with a situation is dis-
turbed or when we discover that our habitually em-
ployed skills are simply not enough to deal with an 
unexpected or otherwise problematic situation, we have 
to appeal to our capacity to deliberate about hidden (not 
immediately perceivable) possibilities to be explored in 
order to achieve our projects and goals. Dreyfus’ account 
thus presupposes various types of actions that differ by 
the means deployed to guide our performance: “feeling 
of greater and lesser tension” when directly replying to 
perceived solicitations on one hand, and deliberation 
when dealing with recalcitrant or otherwise problematic 
situations on the other. Only in the latter case, the agent 
would have to appeal to rational assessment and articu-
lated reasons. However, such division of action into 
“mindless” bodily coping and “minded” deliberation 
opens an unjustified divide within a single phenomenon. 
To my understanding, our habitual embodied coping is 
not deprived of rationality and conversely, our deliberate 
and intentional acting largely depends on enculturated 
bodily habits and skills. Therefore, the answer to the 
objection concerning the illegitimate identification of 
action with “skillful coping” has to dwell on more argu-
ments than Dreyfus’ account can offer, while rejecting 
some of its shortcomings. 
My final aim is to defend a continuity between prac-
tical reasoning (our capacity to justify our performances 
through reasons) and our embodied coping skills, that is 
overlooked or denied by both Brandom’s intellectualist 
and Dreyfus’ anti-rationalist accounts. While both au-
thors introduce a gap between embodied coping skills 
and conceptual skills our discursive capacities, my claim 
is that our involved and embodied coping with the de-
mands of a given situation entails responsiveness to 
reasons and conversely, all partaking in discursive prac-
tices can be seen as an extension of our bodily coping 
skills. To my eyes, Brandom and Dreyfus commit the 
same error, albeit from diametrically opposed perspec-
tives. Brandom begins with linguistic practices and dis-
cursively articulated intentions and ends up providing a 
disembodied or only contingently embodied account of 
action, while Dreyfus proceeds from the bottom up, i.e. 
from our absorbed and mindless responsiveness to 
solicitations to singular episodes of rational deliberation 
or detached reflection, following breakdowns in our 
otherwise smooth and transparent coping with the 
world. Thus, they both neglect the extent to which our 
deliberation and reason-giving practices are part and 
parcel of our intra-subjective and bodily intentional 
transactions. The shared mistake behind these inverted 
accounts consists of thinking in bifurcated terms from 
the start. There is neither ground-floor of bodily ab-
sorbed coping nor an upper story of discursive articula-
tion of reasons, but rather continuous relying on our 
bodily capacities to track changes, solicitations and af-
fordances within the normatively rich social landscapes 
that is always already infused with instituted reasons and 
that frames all of our acting. In my subsequent attempt 
to undermine the unfortunate contrast between our 
perceptual/practical responsiveness to ambient solicita-
tions and responsible action guided by reasons, I draw 
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on already existing criticisms of Dreyfus’ prejudicial 
collapse of intentionally bodily agency into merely mind-
less coping. Many essays in both Schear’s volume Mind, 
Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus 
debate 
Pragmatic Perspectives in Phenomenology (2017) reject a 
rather crude dichotomy between articulated reason-
giving and its supposedly “detached” attitude, on one 
hand, and absorbed, skillful and “mindless coping”, on 
the other, that one finds in Dreyfus.7 The aim of my 
essay, however, is not to engage in the McDowell-
Dreyfus debate about the extent to which conceptuality 
permeates all of human experience, but rather to point 
out the necessity of taking into account – for the sake of 
a pragmatist theory of agency – the normatively rich 
landscape that frames our responsiveness to seemingly 
immediate solicitations while we initiate, perform or 
redirect the course of our action. 
 
Responsiveness to reasons in bodily and skillful coping 
with the situation 
 
Unlike Dreyfus, I will claim that there are not two sepa-
rate classes of action, but that the same acts are to be 
explained both by our practical commitments function-
ing as reasons for action and by our sensitivity to the 
unfolding demands of situation. At the same time, I am 
in complete agreement with him that agents do not have 
to form any representations of rules even if their actions 
are norm-governed by their partaking in shared practic-
es. Moreover, I want to overcome Dreyfus by developing 
his own original and often overlooked claim in which he 
situates the rules in “the landscape on the basis which 
7 However, none of these criticisms deals explicitly with the 
thorny issue of our actions’ responsiveness to reasons, but 
mostly with the pervasiveness of concepts within our under-
standing and perceptual experience. A partial exception is 
McDowell’s own essay “The Myth of the Mind as Detached” in 
Schear (2013) where McDowell argues against Dreyfus that all 
our acting, including its most absorbed and spontaneous kinds, 
are permeated with rationality. When it comes to questioning 
Dreyfus’ dichotomy between bodily absorbed coping and dis-
cursive practices, I highly recommend Carl Sachs’ chapter “Dis-
cursive Intentionality as Embodied Coping: A Pragmatist Critique 
 
skilled coping and reasoning takes place” (Dreyfus 2005, 
53, my emphasis). This insight merits to be explored 
further than Dreyfus himself does. Rules to be followed 
are not in our heads (consciously or unconsciously), they 
do not have to be “internalized”, since they are all 
around us in the instituted frameworks of intelligibility, 
shared practices, in the familiarity of the world to which 
we were introduced. It is therefore enough to remain 
responsive to the demands of a given situation, since our 
social environment as such is norm-governed and per-
meated with already instituted reasons. However, it also 
follows that Dreyfus is wrong in his repeated claim that 
involved and embodied agency does not appeal to rea-
sons at all. He omits, first, that our embodied skills allow-
ing us to master norms as solicitations and are depo-
sitory of instituted reasons that proved to be worthy in 
the past. Second, he fails to acknowledge that the situa-
tion in which we can directly respond to perceived af-
fordances without thinking is always already permeated 
with instituted reasons that belong to the “objective 
spirit” of the community, to use a Hegelian term, rather 
than to the skills of each of the individual actors in-
volved. Our reflective and conceptual skills intervene on 
our habits to shape and to adjust them each time when 
they prove to be maladaptive or when they lead us to 
dead-end streets. Judgements and critical evaluations 
are then stabilized in a transformed set of socially shared 
habits allowing each member of community to cope 
anew unreflectively in a reconfigured situation.  
Merleau-Ponty establishes a structural analogy be-
tween our orientation in a familiar surrounding based on 
our bodily habits and skills and our orientation in the 
world of thoughts on the basis of previously acquired 
judgements:  
When I move about in my house, I know immedi-
ately and without any intervening discourse that 
to walk toward the bathroom involves passing 
close to the bedroom, or that to look out the 
window involves having the fireplace to my left. 
[...] Similarly, there is a “world of thoughts,” a 
sedimentation of our mental operations, which 
allows us to count on our acquired concepts and 
judgments, just as we count upon the things that 
are there and that are given as a whole, without 
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our having to repeat their synthesis at each mo-
ment (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 131). 
 
We “count upon” a lot of things taken for granted with-
out having to think about them, since our environment 
(both physical, social and linguistic) is permeated with 
coordinates that we learned to master through habit-
acquisition. The point to be stressed is that our habit-
formation not only runs in parallel with though-sedi-
mentation, but that these two processes are tied up.8 To 
my sense, taking into account our habit-formation 
through time and within a social environment that serves 
as depository for ready-made reasons provides the most 
promising path to close the gap between acting for rea-
sons and responding to perceived solicitations. The 
passage from Phenomenology of Perception quoted 
above suggests that conceptual content is deposited in 
our habits in a form of sediment. It follows that, pace 
Dreyfus, our embodied openness to perceived af-
fordances is permeated with sedimented or instituted 
rationality and that, pace Brandom, our capacity to reply 
reasonably to the shared norms is beholden to our 
learned and embodied habits and skills.  
The sedimentation of reasons in the practices by 
which we inhabit our social world further explain why 
agents can act in accordance with rules while obeying 
them blindly, as Wittgenstein famously states in Philo-
sophical investigations (1953, 85). Because we take the 
patterns of action embodied in shared practices for 
granted and reliable, our performance of action sticks 
with “the rules of the game” without being a conscious 
application of rules. Thanks to their embodied and encul-
turated sensitivity to salient coordinates, the agents act 
in accordance with the requirements of the rule-
governed social environment. Each one of us, with the 
possible exception of the most severe cases of autism 
spectrum disorder, can be said to act as an “expert” (in 
Dreyfus’ sense of the “involved coper” immediately and 
8 Berendzen (2010) rightly points out that these two processes, 
i.e. habit-acquisition and though-sedimentation, are not inde-
pendent from one another and running in parallel lines but 
support each other. 
appropriately responding to solicitations) in one’s own 
social environment. Such dependence of our expert skills 
upon a background of familiarity goes unnoticed most of 
the time, but think how quickly we get “lost” when dis-
placed in an unfamiliar environment, where we are 
obliged to proceed according to trials, errors and learn-
ing from our missteps and where we are trying to formu-
late provisional hypothesis about rules that we are 
supposed to follow. Merleau-Ponty’s structural analogy 
between moving in one’s own house and moving in the 
“world of thoughts” that we inhabit helps to make sense 
of our bodily and rational dependence upon available 
coordinates in the familiar environment.  
In a similar vein to my account, Levine proposes to 
consider “our capacities for rational action as acquired 
capacities that develop in time due to a series of over-
lapping processes” (Levine 2012, 16). This runs against 
Dreyfus’ dissociation between bodily coping skills and 
responsiveness to reasons.9 Furthermore, Dreyfus’ illus-
trations and arguments for rejecting that absorbed cop-
ing involve any responsiveness to reasons are not 
entirely convincing. Consider his example of acting with-
out any sensitivity or responsivity to reasons: “A door 
affords going in and out, and an observer can see that 
that’s why a person leaving the room goes out the door. 
But the involved coper does not act for that reason as 
such” (2007b, 361). To be sure, not all affordances are 
reasons for actions, so far I am in agreement with Drey-
fus. However, in the example above, the door as af-
fordance figures as a mere part of the whole situation, as 
an affordance, but not even a solicitation. Nobody, not 
even an intellectualist theorist of action, would equate 
this affordance with some reason for action, suggested in 
Dreyfus’s “that’s why”. In order to see where the real 
issue about involved responsiveness to reasons lies, 
9 My paper is prolonging Levine’s (2012) own attempt to over-
come the separation between rational capacities and bodily 
responsiveness to solicitations by taking into consideration the 
social genesis of our habits. To his account, I would add that our 
present embodied skills are depository of instituted reasons 
that proved to be worthy in the past. Furthermore, I want to use 
these insights to contest other shortcomings in Dreyfus’ theory 
of action that Levine mentions only in passing. 
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think rather about someone exiting the door on a harm-
ful remark or offensive gesture made by her partner. 
Such an exit strategy would still be one of the “involved 
coper”, as opposed to the “detached observer”. At the 
same time, the solicitation to which she replied by going 
out was surely perceived by the coper herself as a reason 
propelling her to leave the room. Finally, such a strategy 
is not without ties with other inferentially related rea-
sons: it is better to leave than to assault; the exit is to be 
perceived as an expressive gesture of someone con-
cerned about conserving her personal dignity; it might 
leave some space for our partners’ quieter re-
assessment of a situation that was about to escalate, and 
so on. To put it starkly, the way in which we perform – 
no matter how hastily or unreflectively – our exit strate-
gy is never an exit from the space of reasons.  
Another example might illuminate our responsive-
ness to reasons in absorbed coping even more convinc-
ingly. Consider the insistence with which the dirty dishes 
“speak” to me from the sink where they were left, as if 
they begged me to be washed. In such cases, I unreflec-
tively reply to a perceptual solicitation, without thinking 
about the reasons of my acting or the rules that I am 
following. Nonetheless, these reasons and rules exist and 
they were part of my acquiring the habit of washing the 
dishes shortly after their use. These reasons are mostly 
sanitary, they are tied up with societal and familiar de-
mands about the cleanness of one’s habitat and they 
involve rules and normative assessments concerning 
how thoroughly and how quickly after their use one is 
supposed to wash the dishes. They have become embod-
ied through my family upbringing while I was prepared 
for life under social conditions. We can see from these 
examples that at least some of our habits are acquired 
based on reason-giving practice. However, even when 
they are transmitted by repetition or imitation, there is a 
general rationale to stick with our habits and to follow 
them blindly: social coordination (I shall come back to 
the role of habits and reasons in the coordination of joint 
action in the concluding section below).  
 
Continuity between sensitivity to solicitations and 
answerability to reasons 
 
All these illustrations help us to see that it is a mistake to 
stipulate a stark contrast between acting for reasons and 
bodily skillful coping. We feel drawn or inclined to a 
certain course of action and simultaneously, we are 
more or less aware of reasons propelling us on such a 
path or direction. In fact, when we give an account of our 
acting, we often appeal to both reasons for action (our 
practical and explicitly acknowledged commitments) and 
to the way we felt solicited by opportunities, constraints 
or frustrations that we have met while executing our 
performance. It is worth to be noted, even though I 
cannot develop this point in detail, that in the justificato-
ry accounts of our past action, our acknowledgement of 
responsibility appeals more often to reasons for action, 
while our effort to exculpate ourselves rather tends to 
emphasize our immediate reply to the most salient 
solicitations as main motivations of our conduct. This 
second strategy is not without a rationale of its own to 
the extent it appeals to solicitations and salient af-
fordances of that I have previously identified as instanti-
ations of socially instituted norms to which we are 
supposed to reply in an appropriate manner. At the same 
time, the recurrent mixture of both justificatory strate-
gies in unified accounts further demonstrates that we 
should not conceive of reasons and motivations as be-
longing to independent realms, but rather as continuum 
with two ideally abstracted extremes of “pure reasons” 
and “unmediated replies to solicitations”. To put it simp-
ly, a large part of our actions are simultaneously ac-
countable as motivated by perceived solicitations of the 
environment and done for reasons. The same point was 
raised by O’Conaill in order to soften the binary concep-
tion of “space of reasons” and “space of motivations” 
that one finds in Dreyfus: “If the agent feels drawn to act 
in a certain way and also acts in that way because it is in 
accordance with reason, then the action will be both 
motivated and rational.” (O’Conaill 2014, 449) Although I 
fully subscribe to O’Conaill’s conclusion that it is a mis-
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take to think of spaces of motivations and reasons as 
“mutually exclusive”, my point is slightly different from 
his own: it is crucial not to conceive of “reasons” and 
“motivations” as two separate “items” producing in 
parallel my acting, as if one belonged to my mental 
capacities and the other to my bodily capacities. There is 
no animal nature in me, existing aside from my being 
rational, but rather constant transformation of my innate 
endowment through my adherence to social standards 
and instituted reasons. What motivates my behavior is 
thus not only translated, but also transformed when I 
appeal to solicitations and motivations in the account of 
my acting, that ex definitione belongs to the space of 
reasons and that has to answer to socially acknowledged 
frameworks of intelligibility.  
The continuity between bodily coping and rational 
activity involved in our agency should not be understood 
as mere transition from fundamental layer of non-
cognitive bodily responsiveness and higher layer of ra-
tional and discursive capacities. Such continuity should 
rather be considered in terms of mutual transformative 
relation between non-conceptual and conceptual, spon-
taneous and socially instituted, sentient and sapient 
aspects of human experience. In Brandom’s terms, there 
is a radical transformation of our “sentient” nature 
through our “sapient” skills, a point already raised 
against Dreyfus by McDowell (2007, 344), according to 
whom our acquisition of linguistic capacities thoroughly 
transforms the character of our embodied coping, “in-
cluding the disclosing of affordances”. At the same time, 
we should not omit, as it happens to Brandom and 
McDowell, the constant and never completely overcome 
dependency of our conceptual and discursive skills on 
the bodily responsiveness to others, of which they are 
extension. Such a reciprocity is emphasized by Merleau-
Ponty, for whom every aspect of human existence is 
simultaneously animal (sentient) and institutionalized 
(sapient), so that any clear-cut delimitation that we try 
to establish between the two supposed layers shows up, 
in final analysis, as arbitrary:  
 
It is impossible to superimpose upon man both a 
primary layer of behaviors that could be called 
“natural” and a constructed cultural or spiritual 
world. For man, everything is constructed and 
everything is natural, in the sense that there is no 
single word or behavior that does not owe some-
thing to mere biological being – and, at the same 
time, there is no word or behavior that does not 
break free from animal life, that does not deflect 
vital behaviors from their direction [sens] 
through a sort of escape and a genius for ambi-
guity that might well serve to define man (Mer-
leau-Ponty 2012, 195). 
 
What is crucial in this long quote is the reciprocity be-
tween natural and constructed: to be sure, all biological 
impulses are transformed in human existence through 
being subject of societal demands, but also all conducts 
bear witness of their evolutionary origins and from the 
natural forces that first produced them. Our sexual con-
duct is thus both responsive to animal drives, perceived 
stimuli and solicitations and answerable to incorporated 
habits of conduct and reoriented by joint searching for 
all kinds of refined and consensual pleasures. The crucial 
point of this observation is that these two levels cannot 
be separated but in abstracto, since the supposedly 
“higher layer” has thoroughly modified our animal sexu-
ality and changed the repertoire of our behavioral re-
sponsiveness to sexual signals, however without com-
pletely breaking free from our perceptual sensitivity to 
such solicitations. Corollarily, we are accountable for our 
actions even in cases where we might claim – often in 
bad faith or hypocrisy – that we merely followed our in-
nate drives or animal nature.  
An analogous consideration can serve against the 
split between rational and bodily capacities responsible 
for our agency, a split that is reminiscent of both body-
mind and nature-nurture dualisms. The first step is to 
follow Brandom and locate reasons for action in discur-
sive practices and not to some separated, mental realm 
of detached contemplation. In the second step beyond 
Brandom, it is crucial to acknowledge that discursive 
practices are embodied insofar as they require perceptu-
al-practical skills of adjusting one’s conversational con-
duct to affordances and solicitations provided by our 
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interlocutors. Joseph Rouse (2015, 122) provides a natu-
ralist argument for considering our linguistic skills as 
extensions of integrated bodily capacities. On his evolu-
tionary account, our involvement in reason-giving prac-
tices thus presupposes “a practical-perceptual capacity 
for robust tracking of protolinguistic performances in 
their broader circumstances and for flexibly responsive 
performances (both linguistic and nonlinguistic) motivat-
ed by them”. Such practical-perceptual skills come into 
play each time when we have to coordinate our linguistic 
performances with our interlocutor’s demands, objec-
tions, silences and gestures. Our capacity to reply rea-
sonably to our interlocutors and co-actors is thus 
beholden to our learned and embodied habits. Rouse’s 
entanglement of our discursive capacities within our 
perceptual and practical tracking of available solicitations 
is further developed by Carl Sachs in his attempt to 
explain our social practice of giving and asking for rea-
sons in terms of highly specialized form of embodied 
coping. On Sachs’ (2017, 98) conception, we are bodily 
attuned not only to salient features of our surrounding, 
but also to the contents of each other’s assertions, ques-
tions or objections: “The pragmatic statuses of commit-
ments and entitlements whereby we track propositional 
contents are themselves affordances and solicitations – 
they are affordances and solicitations for the rational 
animals that we are”. All these insights help us to over-
come the intellectualist tendencies in Brandom and 
McDowell, whose concept of rationality is surely context-
specific, but only contingently embodied.  
With this correction, we can side with McDowell 
(1994, 85) against Dreyfus and claim that our embodied 
coping is indeed permeated with instituted rationality. 
Such rationality is not to be searched in individuals’ 
minds, but rather in community’s shared commitments. 
It opens a shared and argumentative space of available 
reasons for action that each member of the community 
can appropriate as her own when solicited to give an 
account of his conduct. Such shared space of available 
reasons was identified by Hegel in terms of “objective 
spirit” and by Merleau-Ponty as “the human space made 
up of those with whom I discuss or of those with whom I 
live” (2012, 25). It is precisely as members of this insti-
tuted space of reasons that we are directly and immedi-
ately responsive to perceived affordances and solicita-
tions. This supposedly “basic” responsiveness however is 
not a “fundamental layer” that we share with animals,10 
but rather something continuously transformed through 
historically evolved norms of correctness, that are still 
ongoing subject of polemics arising from our sapient 
nature. 
 
Conclusion: Acting Together in a Precarious World 
 
In conclusion, let me summarize which insights about 
social and situational embeddedness of action might be 
gathered from this critical assessment of Brandom’s and 
Dreyfus’ accounts of agency. My aim was not only to 
compare their relative strengths and weaknesses, but 
mostly to use this comparison in order to better under-
stand several important aspects that any pragmatically 
oriented theory of action should take into consideration: 
the open-ended character of the situation in which we 
act, the dialectics of action and milieu, the plurality of 
actors and the requirements of social coordination for 
acting in a precarious world.  
Thanks to Dreyfus’ account of embodied sensitivity 
to ongoing solicitations, we are now in a position to 
better understand how an agent is able to realize her 
“Brandomian” practical commitments in order to make 
them true in a social world. We have seen that Bran-
dom’s mistake is to understand our acting as causally 
and unilaterally dependent upon an acknowledged 
commitment: the performance of the action was seen as 
“exit transaction” from the space of reasons. Situational 
embeddedness of agency requires that the agent re-
mains not only committed by the attitudes that she has 
endorsed, but also involved and open to whatever solici-
tations emerge within an ongoing situation. By focusing 
10 Contrary to Dreyfus’ polemical claim directed against 
McDowell: “in their direct dealing with affordances, adults, 
infants, and animals respond alike” (2005: 56). 
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unilaterally on the responsiveness to publicly articulated 
reasons, Brandom omits our bodily sensitivity to the 
unfolding and diversely pressing demands of the situa-
tion itself. 
What is missed is also “the dialectic of milieu and ac-
tion”, to use Merleau-Ponty’s term (1966: 168–169), or 
the dynamic nature of transactions between the organ-
ism and the environment, pointed out by Dewey (1925). 
According to Merleau-Ponty, while our body moves in 
order to get a better grip on a situation, the phenomenal 
field is transformed in a way that allows us to disclose its 
previously hidden aspects and to adjust our performance 
accordingly. Similarly, Dewey emphasized a reciprocal 
relation between our acting and our undergoing the 
consequences of our action (1896: 358–359; 1925: 253). 
Since the solicitations of a milieu change while and be-
cause we act, much of our intelligent engagement with 
the world goes well beyond of what we can frame 
through representations while we deliberate or shape 
the intention upon which we act. Hence the need to 
constantly adjust our performance to new options avail-
able, while dealing with previously unforeseen recalci-
trance of things. So even though it would be absurd to 
say that actions are not goal-directed, one should never 
forget to add that their goals or ends remain mostly 
indeterminate because of the re-configurations that are 
emerging in concomitance with our acting.  
Furthermore, this open-ended character of the situa-
tion to which we belong and whose stakes outrun our 
current understanding is beholden to the plurality of 
actors involved. During the course of its performance, 
my acting is mediated by its interaction with other co-
actors. Individualistic accounts of intentional action are 
simplistic insofar as they neglect each agent’s necessity 
to cope with the significance that others bring into a 
shared situation. The opportunities of further acting in 
the same direction might be foreclosed if relevant others 
refuse to second my proposal or initiative, as they might 
be enriched with new affordances brought by my part-
ners, especially when they push me outside of my com-
fort zone. Dreyfus’ paradigmatic case of lonely driver, 
virtuoso player, expert carpenter or kitchen chef are 
misleading if taken as illustrating essential features of 
human agency. As results from Arendt’s analysis in Hu-
man condition, it is a common mistake to theorize about 
action (praxis) according to the model provided by fabri-
cation (poiesis). Conceiving of action in terms of fabrica-
tion completely misses the plurality of involved actors 
perceiving the common stakes or issues – pragmata in 
the sense of things held in common – from diverse and 
often contradictory perspectives.11 Unlike the work 
(poiesis) of an expert carpenter who is in a position to 
predict and control the result of her activity, our true 
acting (praxis) has to cope with boundless consequences 
we can neither fully anticipate nor control.  
For all these reasons, actors do not put in execution 
a plan they have already conceived from scratch (pre-
dicting each step leading from the current situation to a 
desired outcome). Rather, they commit themselves to 
initiate something new according to their current com-
mitments and anticipations and then let themselves be 
involved in a Brandomian game where each of them has 
to reply to each other’s reply in order to better grasp the 
stakes involved from others’ perspective. This is because 
there is always a complex issue or stake in possible out-
comes of an action, rather than an easily singled out end 
to be identified by the actor alone. The intralinguistic 
practice of giving and asking for reason, however, is nor 
the only game in town, neither a self-sufficient way to 
appraise how one’s performance is perceived and how 
such perception affects its future outcomes. If the actor 
wants to see her initiative to be successful in interactive 
contexts and if she strives to get a better grip on its 
material implications, she has to remain sensitive to the 
manifold ways in which her performance affects the 
others in their hopes, frustrations, feelings of solidarity 
or reciprocal trust. In order to see the pragmatic limits of 
11 Arendt’s paradigm for action is the political action of citizens. 
To my sense, such a model fits much better than absorbed 
coping of a lonely carpenter with a piece of wood the peculiari-
ties of human agency within an indeterminate and shared 
situation, where common future of diversely oriented actors is 
at stake. 
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reason-giving game in politics, consider the contempo-
rary rise of populism, the hopes and frustrations upon 
which it dwells, how it undermines the trust in contem-
porary institutions, putting at stake the very meaning 
and future of liberal democracy.  
This brings us to the final issue of the temporal struc-
ture of acting and its essential orientation towards un-
foreseeable future, from which its meaning will be 
determined. We have seen that what is at stake in action 
always outruns my current understanding, since the 
inferential and material implications of my initiative 
reach far beyond what I could possibly anticipate. Let us 
consider Gorbachev’s program of reforms in the late 
1980s from the perspective inspired by Brandom’s infer-
ential pragmatism. At the time of perestroika (“reorgani-
zation”), most members of the Communist Party as well 
as the few dissidents in the Eastern bloc were interested 
above all in Gorbachev’s intentions, his sincerity and 
commitment to go on through with it, despite the oppo-
sition of his more conservative comrades. Only from the 
perspective of present day, we are in a position to un-
derstand the stakes involved in introducing several liber-
alizing reforms into a largely authoritarian regime, 
resulting in its complete dismantlement. On one hand, 
this observation confirms a point already established 
above: the meaning of an action can never be articulated 
only according to the actor’s own intentions, but also 
involves its reappropriations by an irreducible plurality of 
co-actors. On the other, it points towards a larger prob-
lem: the meaning of an action is also the sum of its ma-
terial consequences that the interaction between actors 
produced, even though none of them, nor all of them 
could have articulate such meaning at the time it was 
performed. When Gorbachev introduced perestroika and 
glasnost (“openness”), he began a new process and 
opened the way for a transformation of a state built 
upon the rule of a party, into a republic where singular 
voices can be heard, leaving at the same time more 
space for autonomy to other socialist countries. To be 
sure, the consequences of such achievements were 
entirely different from what he or any of other implicat-
ed co-actors intended. From the perspective of the pre-
sent day, it is nevertheless possible to establish not only 
a chronological but also a logical or inferential link be-
tween his reforms and the subsequent disintegration of 
authoritarian regimes in the East. 
What lesson might be learned and pragmatically 
formulated from this and previous examples emphasiz-
ing the social embeddedness of action? The first lesson 
consists of the reformulation of Peirce’s pragmatist 
maxim in a way that is valid not only for clarifying our 
ideas or conceptions, but also for determining the con-
tent of intentions upon which we act: to ascertain the 
meaning of an intention, one should consider the sum of 
consequences resulting from the successful making-true 
of that intention. Second, such consideration of practical 
bearings is not something that the agent can do on her 
own: what she shall do, while acknowledging her inten-
tion to act, depends on socially structured normativity 
and is made explicit in the game of giving and asking for 
reasons. Third, because of the open-ended character of 
the situation, the actor also needs to rely during her 
performance on embodied skills, habits and sensitivity to 
most salient affordances that are disclosed while and 
because she acts (and not through merely intralinguistic 
reason-giving practices). Finally, because of the irreduci-
ble plurality of actors’ standpoints and attunements, our 
actions point ahead of themselves towards stakes that 
are indeterminate from the perspective of the present 
day, so that neither the actor, nor her co-actors or im-
partial observers are able to establish the sum of out-
comes in their complexity. This last lesson provides one 
more reason to think of action not according to belief-
desire model, but rather as embodied coping with open-
ended and ambivalent situations, while depending on 
clues provided by our shared background of practices. 
 
* * * 
 
Contingency, uncertainty and ambiguity belong to our 
condition, as pragmatists from Dewey to Rorty have 
often emphasized. The situations in which we act are 
indeterminate and open-ended, our fellows might be-
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have in unpredictable ways, and our intentions some-
times bring about the opposite of what we most sincere-
ly hoped for. And yet, we cannot act without orienting 
our actions towards one another and towards a common 
future. This is a general rationale behind our following of 
the clues provided by our shared and embodied practic-
es that put constraints on our joint acting and make us 
answerable to generalizable, even if continuously revisa-
ble set of norms. 
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